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CONFLICT OF LAWS-LAW APPLICABLE IN FEDERAL COURTS-FEDERAL LAW 
APPLIED To CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS OF ADMIRALTY LAWYER-Plaintiff at-
torney was retained by a Spanish seaman to prosecute personal injury claims 
under the Jones Act1 and the general maritime law. Defendant shipping 
company induced the seaman to fire his la·wyer and to recover instead under 
his Spanish employment contract. Plaintiff sued the shipping company 
in tort for interference with contractual relations. In a federal diversity 
suit, held, for plaintiff. Federal common law should be applied to deter-
mine the validity of the contract and the claim of tortious interference with 
it. Greenberg v. Panama Transp. Co., 185 F. Supp. 320 (D. Mass. 1960). 
The general rule since Erie R.R. v. Tompkins2 has been that federal 
courts, when exercising jurisdiction based solely upon diversity of citizen-
ship, must apply state law to all "substantive" issues.3 The doctrine is 
buttressed by a belief that uniformity is desirable within a given state, 
and that the outcome of a case should not depend upon the mere accident 
of the parties' citizenship.4 Despite the sweeping pronouncement in the 
t 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958). 
2 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
3 Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945). See also HART & WECHSLER, 
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 577-708 (1953). 
4 See Comment, 59 HARv. L. REv. 966 (1946). 
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Erie opinion that there could be no "federal general common law,"5 Erie 
has been almost completely limited to its diversity of citizenship context.6 
Even within the diversity area, however, an important exception has been 
etched. In diversity cases where the issues involved are intimately con-
nected with an area of extensive federal regulation, the courts have felt 
it necessary to apply federal law in order to attain a different uniformity-
national uniformity. Thus in Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co.,1 a 
breach of contract suit, the defendant claimed that certain patents were in-
valid and that therefore the contract violated the Sherman Act.8 Plaintiff 
contended that the applicable state law estopped the defendant to deny 
the validity of the contract. The Supreme Court declared that the Sherman 
Act dominated the entire area, and decided the case by applying a federal 
rule.0 Again, in O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co.,10 where the cause 
of action grew out of a defamatory telegram transmitted from Massachu-
setts to Michigan, the court held that the telegraph company's privilege 
should be determined by reference to federal common law. It reasoned that 
since the company was so highly regulated by the Federal Communications 
Act,11 a uniform rule on privilege must necessarily be formulated.12 
Recently the Supreme Court, in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,13 
applied federal substantive law in granting specific performance of an 
arbitration clause in a collective bargaining contract. The Court declared 
that this substantive law would be formulated with reference to the policies 
expressed by federal labor legislation.14 Although Lincoln Mills was not a 
diversity case,15 it is nevertheless relevant because the Court applied federal 
decisional law to a contract matter not specifically covered by any federal 
Ii 304 U.S. at 78. See generally Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Laws'': Com-
petence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. 
PA. L. REv. 797 (1957); Reifenberg, Federal Common Law, 30 ORE. L. REv. 164 (1951); 
Comments, 40 CoRNELL L. Q. 561 (1955); 53 CoLUM. L. REv. 991 (1953). 
6 See Freund, Feder«l-State Relations in the Opinions of Judge Magruder, 72 HARv. L. 
REv. 1204 (1959); Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 280 (1946); 
Comments, 69 YALE L.J. 1428 (1959); 59 HARV. L. REv. 966 (1946). 
7 317 U.S. 173 (1942). 
826 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958). 
ti "[A] federal statute may not be set at naught, or its benefits denied, by state 
statutes or .•. rules. [The Erie doctrine] is inapplicable to those areas of judicial 
decision within which the policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal 
statutes that legal relations which they affect must be deemed governed by federal law .... " 
317 U.S. at 176. 
10 113 F .2d 539 (1st Cir. 1940). 
1148 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified, as amended, in scattered sections of 15, 47 U.S.C.). 
12 Accord, Vaigneur v. Western Union Tel. Co., 34 F. Supp. 92 (E.D. Tenn. 1940) 
(federal law applied in action for negligence in delivering a telegram). 
13 353 U.S. 448 (1957), 57 CoLUM. L. REv. 1123 (1957). 
14 353 U.S. at 456. 
15 It was brought pursuant to Labor-Management Relations Act § 301 (a), 61 Stat. 156 
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1958), which allows suits between employers and labor 
organizations to be brought in federal district courts without regard to diversity of 
citizenship. 
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statute on the grounds that the rights of the parties were intimately con-
nected with the scheme of federal legislation in the area.10 
In the cases thus far discussed, the issues in question were found to be 
so closely connected with the sweep of some federal statute that resolution 
of these issues required resort to a federal rather than a state rule. In the 
principal case, however, the tortious interference with the attorney-client 
contract was related to a federal statute only because the lawyer was to 
prosecute a client's claim under that act. Certainly this relationship was 
far more remote from a federal act than was the issue of defamation in 
O'Brien or the contract in Sola.17 But even should O'Brien require appli-
cation of federal law to the issue of the validity of the contract in the 
principal case, the tortious interference with that contract remains another 
step further removed from the realm of federal regulation. 
The court does not, however, rest its decision on O'Brien reasoning 
alone. Judge Wyzanski gives considerable weight to the fact that the re-
tainer contract was also to prosecute the client's claim under the general 
maritime law.is In Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co.19 the Supreme Court 
indicated that state law may not be applied to affect rights arising under 
admiralty law. It has also been suggested that the Erie doctrine should 
not apply even in diversity cases when maritime issues are concerned20 
since these matters vitally affect the "interests, powers and relations of the 
Federal Government [such] as to require uniform national disposition rather 
than diversified state rulings."21 The difficulty with the application of 
these arguments to the principal case, however, is that the attorney-client 
contract there is simply not a "maritime issue."22 In United Fruit Co. v. 
16 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, contended that § 301 is a grant of jurisdiction 
only, and implies neither the existence nor the establishment of a body of federal sub-
stantive law. He had expressed a similar view while writing for the majority in 'Westing-
house Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955). 
17 Cf. Dickinson v. Stiles, 246 U.S. 631 (1918) (state law governs existence of attorney's 
lien on judgment under FELA); Great Lakes Transit Corp. v. Marceau, 154 F.2d 623 (2d 
Cir. 1946) (state law assumed to apply to govern attorney's lien on judgment under Jones 
Act); Roe v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 132 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1943) (liability under attorney• 
client contract to prosecute federal tax refund claim determined by state law). 
18 Principal case at 324. See generally Romero v. Int'! Terminal Operating Co., 358 
U.S. 354 (1959); Kurland, The Romero Case and Some Problems of Federal Jurisdiction, 
73 HARv. L. REv. 817 (1960). 
10 317 U.S. 239 (1942). 
20 Stevens, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the Uniform General .Maritime Law, 64 HARV. 
L. REv. 246 (1950). 
21 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947). See generally Stevens, 
supra note 20; Comment, 59 HARV. L. REv. 966 (1946). 
22 See SPRAGUE & HEALY, ADMIRALTY 90-91 (1950). See generally GILMORE & BLACK, 
ADMIRALTY 48 (1957); Stevens, supra note 20; Knauth, The Landward Extension of Ad-
miralty Jurisdiction, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1949). Although not alluded to by the court in 
the principal case, the doctrine that seamen are "wards of admiralty" might well have 
aided its argument for applying federal law to the validity of the contract. The doctrine 
likens seamen's contracts to those of ". . • young heirs, dealing with their expectancies, 
wards with their guardians, and cestuis que trustent with their trustees," and asserts a 
broad power in admiralty courts to oversee such contracts. See the Supreme Court's dis-
cussion of the doctrine in Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 246-47 (1942). 
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United States Shipping Bd. Merchant Fleet Corp.,2s the court pointed out 
that in order to be a maritime contract an agreement must relate closely 
to a ship in its use, or to commerce on navigable waters.24 For example, a 
contract of insurance is maritime, but a contract to procure insurance upon 
a cargo is non-maritime.25 Again, even if the attorney's contract in the 
principal case could be said to have maritime character, it would certainly 
seem that a shore-side tortious interference with it could not.26 
Thus neither the reasoning of O'Brien nor that of Garrett can support 
the court's conclusion. Yet the court seemed to feel that combined they 
could accomplish that which separately they could not.27 In spite of broad 
language in the opinion,28 it is doubtful that the decision will result in 
application of federal law to all contractual relations of "federal lawyers" 
or to any tortious interference with these relations. Since the present case 
relies not only upon the proximity of a federal statute, but also upon the 
applicability of maritime law, it seems much more likely that its result will 
be confined rather closely to its facts. 
23 42 F.2d 222 (D. Mass. 1930). 
24 Id. at 225. 
Robert E. Thorne, S. Ed. 
25 Jbid.; Home Ins. Co. v. Merchants Transp. Co., 16 F.2d 372 (9th Cir. 1926). 
26 Cf. United Fruit Co. v. U.S. Shipping Corp., 42 F.2d 222, 224 (D. Mass. 1930). It 
is well settled that admiralty jurisdiction in matters of tort depends on locality, i.e., 
whether the act was committed on navigable waters. 
27 The court further supports its conclusion by resorting to a conflict of laws rationale 
usually applied only in a different conte.xt. In Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40 (D. 
Mass.), aff'd, 178 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1949), a case involving alienation of affections, the 
normal conflict of laws rule would have demanded that the law of the state of the 
matrimonial domicile be applied to substantive issues. The court found, however, that 
contrary public policy of the state of the forum was sufficiently strong to override the 
general rule. Thus because of policy it applied the law of the state of the forum rather 
than that of the state of domicile. Citing the Gordon decision, the court in the principal 
case decided that the policy favoring national uniformity required that Erie be ignored, 
and that federal law be applied rather tlian that of the state. Principal case at 324-25. 
This would seem to be a novel circumvention of the Erie doctrine. 
28 "The controlling principles of substantive law should be enunciated on a national 
basis applicable to anyone who is said to have interfered with a professional relation 
between an officer of a national court and his client." Principal case at 324-25 (citing 
O'Brien). 
